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ABSTRACT
The European Commission launched the “Smart Borders” policy
process in 2011 to enhance border security in the European Union
(EU) using technologisation and harmonisation. This includes the
use of automated border control (ABC) systems. The Member
States crucially shape the process, weighing security technologies
and costs, privacy and rights, and further institutional choices. We
examine the views of political stakeholders in four Member States
by conducting a systematic empirical and comparative study
unprecedented in the existing, political-theory-inspired research.
In our Q methodological experiments, political stakeholders in
Finland, Romania, Spain and the UK rank-ordered a sample of
statements on Smart Borders, ABC and harmonisation. The factor
analysis of the results yielded three main views: the first criticising
ABC as a security technology, the second welcoming the security
gains of automation and the third opposing harmonised border
control. While impeding harmonisation, the results offer a
consensus facilitating common policy.
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Border security has become a salient policy issue across Europe. The unexpected influx of
“irregular”migrants into several European Union (EU) Member States from the neighbour-
ing regions since 2015 adds to the security concerns related to unauthorised overstays,
cross-border terrorism and crime. At the same time, border-crossings in and out of the
EU are increasing and may reach 887 million by 2025 (European Commission 2016a, p. 2),
while the border control resources cannot keep pace. These trends drive the technologisa-
tion and digitalisation of border security. In addition to GPS and satellite-assisted surveil-
lance of “pre-frontier” areas, at the border technologisation includes the use of passport
readers, biometrics for identity verification, automated processes and monitoring of flows
of people through automated border control (ABC). This shift underpins the ongoing
debate on new border control policies, border-crossing practices and more widely the
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role of the security industry in Europe (Vaughan-Williams 2015, pp. 21–28). As a result,
border control has evolved from “narrow” protection of territory by the border guard to a
complex high-technology process, leading to a wider concept of border security including
large-scale data management in cyberspace (Heiskanen 2014, pp. 69–70).
Meanwhile, the policy debate on border control in Europe features the effects of differ-
entiated integration, whereby EU-level harmonisation efforts coexist with different views
among the Member States (see Leruth 2015). Twenty-two out of 28 EU Member States
belong to the Schengen area. They follow the Schengen Borders Code, which has abol-
ished internal border controls and introduced co-operation on external borders and
visas. While the Schengen Members have granted the Frontex agency certain suprana-
tional powers to co-ordinate the technical standards of border control, these states con-
tinue to have national policies (Boulanin and Bellais 2014, pp. 235–236). At the
beginning of 2016, several Schengen Members started to re-establish border controls in
response to immigration-related threat perceptions. By eroding trust and common iden-
tity, these unilateral decisions may eventually dissolve the security community upon
which the Schengen area stands (Alkopher and Blanc 2016).
Harmonisation, therefore, hinges on the decisions of Member States. A key process in
this is the “Smart Borders” policy the European Commission introduced in 2011. It seeks to
better secure the Union’s external borders and streamline border-crossing by relying
increasingly on automated information sharing and self-service. This includes the legisla-
tive proposal of April 2016 on a common entry/exit system (EES) for third-country
nationals and corresponding amendments to the Schengen Borders Code, and concomi-
tant suggestions for further technologisation (European Commission 2016a, 2016b). The
November 2016 proposal for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System
(ETIAS) externalises border control towards “policing at a distance” (Skleparis 2016,
p. 107), by subjecting visa-free passengers to digitalised advance checks for security
and irregular migration. Further proposals include a Passenger Name Record Directive,
enhanced security features in travel documents, more systematic checks on EU external
borders and enhancement of the Schengen Information System (European Commission
2016c). At issue is a contentious mixture of policy issues involving security, costs, mobility,
fundamental rights and privacy (e.g. Bigo et al. 2012).
Here we address the complex nexus of ABC technologies; the privacy, rights and legal
issues involved; and further institutional choices as subjectively perceived by Member
States’ political stakeholders. This is a novel line of enquiry in three major respects. First,
it responds to Hills’ (2006, p. 67) call a decade ago for more empirical evidence: “Border
security is an empirical manifestation of a state’s adaptation into its political environment”,
while “functional security” is “neglected by the academy”, and thus research on the empiri-
cal dimensions of border security is needed to “rebalance the debate”. Second, while many
studies concentrate on EU-level policies, we consider the Member States, as yet little
addressed in the literature. They share the competence with the Union in border control,
participate in the Smart Borders policy process, and develop and implement policies at
the national level. Member States also produce competing political imperatives on actual
EU-level policies. For example, a recent single-case study highlights how national-level
securitisation of border-crossing risks illiberal practices at the EU borders (Skleparis 2016).
Third, while critical border studies often evince a political theory-informed critique of
policies (see next section), we empower some of the actors “in the field”, examining
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and comparing the subjective views of political stakeholders vis-à-vis ABC in four EU
Member States: Finland, Romania, Spain and the UK. We focus mostly on Members of Par-
liament, because national parliaments debate the EU initiatives, report back to the EU insti-
tutions and make the respective national budget allocations. Our effort is broadly
informed by the “practice turn” in critical security and border studies in concentrating
on a group of actors steering the development and deployment of security technologies.
This helps us to focus on the meaning of policies “as understood by the actors in these
fields”, and to study these security practices through their “shared understandings and dis-
agreements” which “make up border security” (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014, pp. 197–198).
To gain an empirical insight into the shared views and contentions of Member States’
political stakeholders, we apply Q methodology, thereby enabling participants to question
the security technologies from their own subjective standpoints. Importantly this affords
an empirically grounded idea of the political concerns and incentives regarding the
technologisation and harmonisation of border security to complement political theory-
informed critique. We understand the security technologies scrutinised as results of inter-
action among actors with different views. Because the technologies function on behalf of
the user governments, the Member States’ stakeholders can assign normative and political
considerations to them that in turn deserve systematic empirical research (see Amicelle
et al. 2015, p. 297, Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, pp. 327–329). Hence our contri-
bution is driven less by theory and more by methodology (see Côté-Boucher et al.
2014), prioritising the empirical evidence in the subjective views of political stakeholders.
We therefore ask the following: (1) What views do political stakeholders in Finland,
Romania, Spain and the UK have on the development of ABC systems? (2) Can we identify
any common ground among these views on which to build European border control pol-
icies? We first introduce our methodological choices and then outline our results featuring
three different views on ABC and the common ground among them, along with policy rec-
ommendations based on the consensus and the wider implications for European border
control policies.
Research design: the Q methodological approach to views of political
stakeholders
Case study countries
Our case study countries Finland, Romania, Spain and the UK display a wide variation of
border challenges and policies in terms of membership of the Schengen agreement, insti-
tutionalisation of ABC and positions on the Smart Borders process. While a four-country
comparison is not representative of all EU Member States, it illustrates the potential
range of views.
Regarding border challenges, all our cases have significant external entry points to the
EU (Frontex 2013). Finland and Romania have much traversed land borders. There is
occasional congestion on the Finnish–Russian border, likewise on the border between
Romania and Moldavia, and also on that with Ukraine. In the UK and Spain, the major
external entry points to the EU are the airports, namely London Heathrow, London
Gatwick, Manchester and Madrid Barajas. The Spanish autonomous communities of
Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa are also major gateways to the EU. The southern
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borders of the EU, alongside the borders with the Middle East, manifest a complex inter-
section of border security issues ranging from immigration and terrorism to fundamental
rights (Del Sarto and Steindler 2015).
Regarding policy, these countries were not chosen to model the number of incoming
asylum seekers, which rose dramatically in 2015 (Frontex 2015), but rather the variation in
the development of border control policies including ABC. The UK has a Schengen opt-out,
and will not participate in the Smart Borders policies. In June 2016, it also voted to exit the
EU. The country is nevertheless interesting, being perhaps the most institutionalised case
of European ABC use, with automated systems at most airports and plans to acquire elec-
tronic gates for seaports and railway stations. Finland, a Schengen member, considers
Smart Borders to enable more extensive ABC use, which could expedite the Fenno-
Russian border traffic, which since 2014 has suffered from the sanctions imposed by the
EU and Russia. Finland utilises ABC systems at the main traffic hubs at air borders, and
some land and sea borders. Spain and Romania have endorsed the Smart Borders EES,
which would help them to detect possible overstays. Spain, a Schengen member, has
recently expanded ABC to cover the most important airports, along with one land
border and one seaport. Romania is only pursuing Schengen membership and plans to
pilot ABC systems at the land border with Serbia and at Bucharest Airport.
Modelling the ABC debate
We modelled the ABC debate on the all-European level by first exhaustively reviewing the
existing literature and policy documents. We then formatted the emerging views into 230
short statements. To discern the crucial technological approaches in the ABC debate, we
drew on guideline documents (e.g. those produced by Frontex and the International Civil
Aviation Organisation) and academic articles mostly discussing biometric authentication
(e.g. Kwon and Moon 2008, Jain and Kumar 2012). We extracted EU-level policy prefer-
ences from publications by the European Commission, the European Data Protection
Supervisor and the Biometric European Stakeholders Network, among others. To compre-
hend the public political debate, we used Smart Borders evaluations (e.g. Bigo et al. 2012,
Hayes and Vermeulen 2012) and consulted national and EU newspaper articles along with
press releases by various European Parliament groups and independent advocacy groups.
For the wider expert debate on border policy, we reviewed the existing research, which
often draws upon political theory and is quite critical of ABC and related technologies. For
example, some authors were alarmed by modern states’ proactive use of risk management
technologies (Ceyhan 2008, Skleparis 2016). These observers associate such technologies
with securitisation, that is, processes in which issues are brought under the security logic of
emergency measures, delimiting public debate and involvement (Lodge 2004, Muller
2011). Scholars criticise the securitisation of migration, especially in the post-9/11
context (Alkopher and Blanc 2016), and the ensuing entanglement of security and immi-
gration policies (Muller 2004, Dijstelbloem et al. 2011), potentially undermining, for
example, asylum seekers’ rights (Palm 2013). The research also identifies threats to
users’ privacy due to biometric identification and European databases (Broeders 2007,
Harel 2009, van der Ploeg 2009, Friedewald et al. 2010, Mordini and Rebera 2012).
We divided this debate into three themes. The first, “technological options” (A),
includes statements on ABC technology, including its costs. The second theme,
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“privacy, rights and legal issues” (B), includes statements on protecting privacy, human
rights and the lawful use of ABC. The third theme, “institutional processes” (C), concerns
the wider institutional choices involved and some political economy issues. Each of the
themes contained three types of statements: representative (as in declarative, describing
the status quo) (a), explicitly normative (b) and a policy recommendation (c). We cross-
tabulated the debate themes and statement types to create a heuristic model of the
policy debate (Table 1). The purpose of the model is practical: to help locate as
diverse statements as possible and select from these a balanced, relevant sample (see
Brown 1986). We placed the 230 statements into the cells of the model (Aa, Ab, etc.)
and then selected an equal number of statements from each cell. To establish which
statements were of the greatest practical relevance, we tested a sample of 43 statements
empirically with 19 Finnish political stakeholders, who rank-ordered the statements and
commented on them in interviews (Lehtonen and Aalto 2015). We then fine-tuned the
statements and reduced their number to 34 in order to “lighten the cognitive burden”
of the participants (see Dryzek et al. 1989, p. 484). The complete Q sample is listed in
the Appendix, with indications as to which cell of the model each statement belongs.
Participants
The importance of the views of political stakeholders on ABC stems from the increasing
salience of border security. While the EU level features policy co-ordination efforts,
decisions to commission and introduce ABC systems are taken by national governments
and their agencies. National parliaments discuss both EU-level and national policies and
allocate the funds; decisions regarding ABC and Smart Borders are most often deliberated
in committees on justice and home affairs. We selected the participants, primarily
Members of Parliament, according to their committee memberships, political affiliations
and backgrounds. The aim was to include well-informed participants able to react to
our statements and representing the most important political parties in the case countries.
We included 44 participants, which suits the small-N Q methodology well: it is essential to
include representatives of all pertinent categories of perspectives, instead of a quantitat-
ively representative sample of individuals (Dryzek et al. 1989). Typically Q studies feature
20–40 carefully selected participants. Our study covered the political spectrum and current
trends such as the rise of the right-wing and populist, immigration and EU-critical parties in
the UK and Finland1 (Auel and Raunio 2014, Leruth 2015).
Twenty of the 44 participants were members of national parliaments (MPs), one senator
and three Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Twelve were senior officials of
their respective political parties and involved in committee work on issues relevant to
the study. The remaining eight were non-partisan, high-level experts in border control,
data protection, technology policy and public as well as immigration law contributing
Table 1. The heuristic model of the policy debate.
Technological
possibilities (A)




Representative (a) Aa Ba Ca
Normative (b) Ab Bb Cb
Policy recommendation (c) Ac Bc Cc
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to the debate. In the case of the UK, we included three experts working for think tanks
considered to be Conservative and Unionist Party-inclined, although officially non-parti-
san, because the Conservative MPs and political staff declined to participate.
Altogether 18 political parties were represented through their elected and employed
agents, covering the major parties in each case country. Regarding nationality, there
were 16 participants from Finland, 10 from the UK, 8 from Romania and 7 from Spain.
As control cases vis-à-vis the conservative, Eurosceptic parties and correspondingly the
European Parliament group the Greens/the European Free Alliance to monitor standpoints
against data collection and Smart Borders, we further included one Dutch, one Danish and
one Latvian participant (Table 2).
The Q sorting experiments
All participating political stakeholders conducted individual, online Q sorting experiments,
where they ranked the final 34 statements of the Q sample. The experiments took place
between February and November 2014, when the Member States debated the Commis-
sion’s 2011 Smart Borders proposal, as an input into the Commission’s second Smart
Borders package in 2016 and before the vote in the UK on leaving the Union. With this
timeline, the results of the experiments also address some of the problems and delays
in the Smart Borders process.
The participants accessed the password-protected Q sorting platform and received
instructions through the FlashQ programme, which then saved the experiment data on
a server. The participants sorted the statements visualised as cards according to their
agreement or disagreement, relying on their current, subjective views, which would pre-
sumably be implemented in their advisory and/or decision-making roles. They made a
primary sort into three categories, “agree”, “neutral” and “disagree”, then a detailed sort,
placing each statement in an empty slot on the forced “normal distribution” grid
ranging from −4 through 0 to 4. In this way, we modelled the prioritisations they would
normally choose in the relevant policy issues. We verified the validity of the data by
requesting participants to explain in writing why they had placed statements in the
extreme columns. This ensured that the participants understood the statements similarly
and sorted them according to their opinions, which guarantees the inter-comparability
and reliability of the Q sorts.
Analysis of the data
We analysed the Q sort data with the PQ Method programme to identify the most dis-
tinguishable and interpretable factors or views on ABC. Having experimented with
various combinations of factor extraction and rotation methods, we chose a three-factor
solution produced with principal component analysis and judgemental rotation. The
factors account altogether for a satisfactory 50% of the variation among the Q sorts.
The remaining Q sort data were too fragmented, with views which were too idiosyncratic
to yield factors amenable to reliable interpretation.
Two indicators are decisive in Q methodological data: the loading of a participant on
each factor and the factor Q scores. The participants’ loadings indicate the extent to
which they agree with a factor: a loading of 1.00 would signify total agreement and
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−1.00 absolute disagreement. The minimum value of a statistically significant loading at
the p < .01 level was set at 0.44 using Brown’s (1986, p. 64) formula. Participants’ factor
loadings are listed in Table 2, with the significant ones marked X. To keep the views the
factors expressed as distinct as possible, participants loading significantly on multiple
factors (participants 19, 34, 36 and 44) were excluded from the definition of the factors,
along with participants 8, 24 and 42 loading less than 0.44 on all factors.
Table 2. Participants and their factor loadings, significant loadings flagged with an X.
Participant Loading on factors
Natl. Position Party/organisation Party definition F1 F2 F3
1 UK Political staff Liberal Democrats R 0.58X 0.21 0.24
2 ES MP Socialist Workers’ Party L 0.65X 0.35 0.26
3 ES MP United Left L 0.50X 0.06 0.28
4 ES MP People’s Party R 0.29 0.63X 0.37
5 UK Political staff Labour L 0.79X −0.12 0.22
6 RO MP Dem. All. of Hungarians Min. 0.31 0.46X 0.26
7 ES MP People’s Party R 0.11 0.69X 0.14
8 UK MP Labour L −0.06 0.20 −0.22
9 UK Expert National Audit Office – 0.19 0.51X 0.15
10 RO Political staff Social Democratic Party L 0.12 0.69X 0.32
11 ES MP People’s Party R 0.26 0.59X 0.19
12 ES MP Socialist Workers’ Party L 0.67X 0.34 −0.02
13 FI Expert University – 0.29 0.74X 0.19
14 FI Expert Non-Governmental Org. – 0.62X −0.09 0.21
15 FI Expert Government Agency – 0.68X 0.23 0.10
16 FI Political staff Social Democratic Party L 0.66X 0.42 −0.02
17 FI MP Left Alliance L 0.77X −0.23 −0.15
18 FI Expert University – 0.88X −0.15 −0.01
19 FI Political staff Centre Party C 0.21 0.58 0.51
20 FI MP Centre Party C 0.08 0.61X −0.14
21 FI MP Social Democratic Party L 0.76X −0.08 0.05
22 FI Political staff National Coalition Party R −0.04 0.48X 0.33
23 FI MP Left Alliance L 0.64X 0.32 0.01
24 FI MP National Coalition Party R −0.24 0.10 0.40
25 FI Political staff The Finns Party RR/Anti-EU 0.08 0.05 0.44X
26 FI MP The Greens Env./C 0.77X −0.12 0.01
27 RO MP Social Democratic Party L −0.04 0.76X 0.17
28 RO MEP National Liberal Party R 0.31 0.45X 0.26
29 RO MP Social Democratic Party L 0.23 0.68X 0.16
30 FI MP The Finns Party RR/Anti-EU 0.12 0.16 0.79X
31 RO MP Social Democratic Party L 0.59X 0.03 0.21
32 UK MEP UK Independence Party RR/Anti-EU 0.11 0.65X 0.25
33 NL Political staff Reformed Political Party R 0.22 0.39 0.45X
34 FI MP The Finns Party RR/Anti-EU −0.44 0.53 −0.09
35 UK MEP UK Independence Party RR/Anti-EU 0.00 −0.38 0.60X
36 RO Political staff New Republic Party R −0.27 0.57 0.56
37 RO Senator National Liberal Party R 0.43 0.49X 0.16
38 UK Expert Think tank (R) 0.55X −0.08 0.41
39 LV Political staff Greens/EFA Env. 0.88X −0.19 −0.06
40 ES Political staff Socialist Workers’ Party L 0.70X −0.03 0.00
41 UK MP Liberal Democrats R 0.50X 0.14 0.40
42 UK Expert Think tank (R) 0.25 0.40 0.15
43 DK Political staff Greens/EFA Env. 0.76X 0.00 0.08
44 UK Expert Think tank (R) 0.44 0.27 0.65
Explains the variance among Q sorts at 24% 17% 9%
Notes: Party definitions: centre (C), environmental (Env.), Eurosceptic (Anti-EU), left (L), minority rights (Min.), radical right
(RR), right (R). Sources of the definitions: Brack and Startin (2015), Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2014), Hloušek and
Kopeček (2010), Rovny (2014), Stan (2013). The abbreviated nationalities: British, UK; Danish, DK; Dutch, NL; Finnish, FI;
Latvian, LV; Romanian, RO; Spanish, ES.
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The factor Q scores represent the “ideal values” of an imaginary respondent totally
agreeing with the factor, calculated from the defining, significantly loading Q sorts.
They range here from −4 to 4, the equivalent spectrum along which the participants
sorted the statements. The Q scores indicate (dis)similarities between factors and help
to create a narrative of the content of each factor, a “factor view” shared by the defining
participants. Extremely high and low scores, along with the difference or similarity of
scores between factors, merit attention (see Appendix). In addition to the Q scores, we
used participants’ written comments in the narrative creation.
Results: three views on ABC
The results of our Q methodological analysis revealed three distinctive factor views, illus-
trated in terms of the factor scores and participants’ comments (P1–P44, see Table 2).
First view: privacy rights must be safeguarded
The first view explains 24% of the variation among Q sorts, gaining the support of 19 par-
ticipants. View 1 was subscribed to by all the case nationalities and defined by social
democrat, left-wing, environmental and liberal politicians and party staff, likewise by
law and data protection-oriented experts.
Participants sharing View 1 deemed the decisions regarding ABC political in nature, as
they have implications for fundamental rights. This view was opposed to letting experts
and scientists steer the automation of border control. It called for the harmonisation of
EU legislation and clear, unified policies on ABC based on the notion of the Union
having one external border. EU refugee policy was criticised (P12), with a call to incorpor-
ate the just treatment of asylum seekers into the design of the forthcoming ABC systems
and databases; this referred to the risk profiling used in ABC, which, according to View 1,
might lead to discrimination.
The goal of ABC for the first view is “to increase the knowledge that states have about
people travelling” (P5), that is, the “intellectual expansion of the central state” (P1), not
merely to facilitate travel. The view asserts that ensuring security is compatible with the
individual’s right to privacy (P1, P37 and P39). It calls for the personal right not to disclose
intimate, biometric data even to the authorities. Participants strongly opposed State-
ment 1, claiming that honest people should have no reason to object to their biometrics
being collected and used in border control (P2, P12 and P31). The statement reminded
Spanish Participant 2 of the dictatorial and authoritarian argumentation of the Franco
administration, while Romanian Participant 31 was wary of biometric data becoming “a
tool for the Government against its citizens”. Fingerprinting third-country nationals at
border-crossings for Smart Borders also appeared alarming to those subscribing to View
1; it compromises the presumption of innocence. Supporters of this view stressed that
there was more than enough proof of data misuse from the past. Participant 41 made a
case for everyone having the right to “disappear and reboot”:
Even the most secure and compartmentalised data will be shared eventually, because of
natural curiosity or greed or paranoia […] it should therefore as a matter of principle be as
skeletal as is compatible with achieving the published primary aims of its collection.
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Strict data usage limitations should apply, allowing data collected by border control to be
used for that purpose only; the ﬁrst view is very wary of “surveillance creeps”, that is, the
wider use of a technology or a system beyond its original scope potentially encroaching on
privacy.2 Law enforcement authorities in the EU should accordingly not have access to
border control databases, not even to combat terrorism. This goes against the April
2016 Smart Borders proposal, which would allow the access even in the case of third-
country nationals (European Commission 2016a, p. 11). The “different” legal systems of
EU Member States would not guarantee the exclusive legitimate use of the data (P31),
as “corruption, low or no accountability for wrongdoing and discrimination prevail
among the authorities of many Member States” (P14). For View 1, this gives reason to
be critical of an EU-wide biometric data system. Further, ABC and Smart Borders represent
a danger of increased, unjustiﬁed surveillance of EU citizens. The participants considered it
very tempting for Member States to use the border control data for other purposes (P26,
P39 and P41). A loophole in the supervisory arrangements of only one state or border
agency in the EU could have dire consequences (P41). View 1 moreover involved propor-
tionality: “since we don’t ﬁngerprint everyone for ﬁghting crime, the principle of
proportionality should also be applied to border controls” (P39). Accordingly, hidden con-
trols to catch potential aggressors were rejected. Participant 41 pointed out the volatility of
the concept of terrorism:
European ideas on what terrorism is have changed: the Hitler bomb plot and the French resist-
ance being heroic, and the tube suicide bombers being cowardly. Some EU countries give
sanctuary to those that other states seek to extradite for terrorism. Fashions in these things
change, but the data remains on record.
Second view: ABC will enhance security and advance European integration
The second most explanatory view, at 17% and with 13 participants loading significantly
on it, was supported mainly by right-wing and centre-right political parties in all our case
countries, although the Romanian participants supported the view more widely.
For the second view, border security was paramount and could be enhanced by auto-
mating border control. The EU should thus strive to be at the forefront in acquiring the
most modern, efficient and safest technological solutions in border control. The security
attributes of ABC systems were believed to override other considerations, such as the
speeding up of border-crossing, as the EU was seen to “attract illegal cross border
threats and other sources of instability from outside the Union” (P10). This is why View
2 demands a risk-based approach in border control, referring to “directing border
guards at those deemed the riskiest […] not spending time checking the passports of
very low-risk passengers” (P9). Automated risk profiling was considered an advantage of
ABC, especially given the “sheer volumes of people travelling, and projections of greater
numbers in the future” (P9).
The second view accepted the use of travellers’ biometrics far more extensively than
the first view. Advocating EU-wide identification databases in ABC and deeming the ver-
ification of passengers’ identity insufficient, View 2 was also in favour of using these data-
bases in solving serious crimes and combatting terrorism by sharing their information with
law enforcement authorities. The use of biometrics in ABC and Smart Borders was encour-
aged: this view included no notion of potentially unjustified surveillance of EU citizens or
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surveillance creeps. Nevertheless, it calls for a “detailed study on which data should be
used and for what purposes” (P11), along with demanding transparency by condemning
hidden control of travellers even if it might help to catch potential aggressors. View 2
moreover postulates that while the increased use of biometrics is undertaken in the inter-
ests of public safety, immigrants do not constitute an internal security threat to the EU:
“immigrants are not criminals and the system does not try to forbid immigration” (P4).
Those subscribing to View 2 support the harmonisation of ABC processes and gates in
the EU not only for cost efficiency and security, but also due to their usefulness in the Euro-
pean integration process. They articulated a need to harmonise processes in the EU when-
ever possible “in order to build a real European Union” (P11), which “needs more
federative elements” (P13). The second view welcomed EU legislation on border control
as a “logical evolution of further integration in policies, including those referring to
common security […] the EU must assume responsibility for further integrated external
border control if free movement of EU citizens is to be maintained” (P7). View 2 further-
more deemed ABC a worthwhile investment despite the current difficult European
economic situation. The technology might initially be costly, but would offer a safety-
enhancing, cost-effective alternative to hiring more border guards to process growing
traveller volumes, as Participant 7 explained:
New investments related to new technologies are always at first considered an unnecessary
expense […] it is exactly the opposite. In the long run automated border control technology
will allow states not to employ so many personnel at their borders, and be able to specialise in
fighting against specific crimes along borders.
One participant furthermore perceived ABC as an opportunity to combat corruption: “It
has been demonstrated many times that the border police is corrupt and an automated
border would eliminate this risk” (P27).
Third view: Eurosceptics against immigration
Four participants shared View 3, explaining 9% of the variation among Q sorts. They rep-
resented the British, Dutch and Finnish far right, Eurosceptic parties, which belonged to
the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group in the European Parliament until its 2014
reform. The third view argues for stricter border control by reason of deeming “constant
concerns about increasing immigration” legitimate due to the “social and economic con-
sequences for European society” (P33). Immigration is framed as a soft security threat: “The
people of the UK think illegal immigration is the biggest problem in our country, next to
open borders, the numbers of people entering the UK and the rising crime directly attribu-
table to non-UK nationals” (P35).
It seems inherent in View 3 that “EU citizens have different rights compared to third-
country nationals” (P30), and thus fingerprinting the latter for Smart Borders, for
example, is justified for security reasons. Risk profiling in ABC and any consequent poten-
tial to discriminate against certain nationalities or ethnicities were not a concern for those
subscribing to View 3, nor was the inability of developing countries to produce biometric
passports, which might raise suspicion regarding their citizens in the context of ABC.
Opposing the surveillance of EU citizens in general, View 3 remarkably, and contrary to
the two other views, advocates covert surveillance of passengers at borders to catch
potential aggressors. Those who are not “bad guys” should have nothing to fear from
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monitoring (P25). In contrast, View 3 also urged transparency on the part of the states in
providing travellers with explicit statements on the use of their biometrics (P25).
The current data protection systems in many EU Member States invoked scepticism in
View 3 participants; they are not reliable enough for ABC. Biometric identification data are
considered inherently unsafe (P35) and the participants mistrust the governments’ ability
to keep them safe. This view stressed the political and legal implications of ABC and Smart
Borders; it wanted to avoid labelling them as technological development. Rather, View 3
wanted to bring privacy questions centre-stage in the ABC debate. “Big Brother is watch-
ing”, commented Participant 35, continuing: “Where data can be kept, compiled and lost,
citizens’ right to privacy will be invaded and not properly safeguarded. […] We are free
because we are born free, we do not need EU surveillance.”
The third view on the whole articulated a reluctance to proceed with ABC. It recognised
not only the need to “investigate and use technical solutions where possible”, but also the
“constant anxiety of many citizens regarding the expanding possibilities of governments
to control their lives”; technical systems can be used in the service of humankind, but “as
long as human nature doesn’t improve, the risks grow with the possibilities” (P33). The
supporters of the view considered acquiring ABC technology a worse investment than
recruiting more border guards. Harmonising ABC processes and gates was not supported
because “top-down approaches do not work very often […] the EU is welcomed to offer a
best practice approach” (P30). Instead, each Member State should act at its own sovereign
discretion on border control practices. If the EU decided to proceed nonetheless with har-
monised ABC, the third view insisted on the Union compensating Member States forced to
invest more than others to comply with the standards. Finally, View 3 did favour ABC at
land and maritime borders, given the benefits likely to accrue in processing asylum
claims at EU’s southern borders: “Failing registration of refugees by Southern Member
States mainly concerns land and maritime crossings. This puts EU-wide solidarity under
high pressure. It would be very helpful that the EU takes its responsibility in developing
applications” (P33).
Agreement across the three views
The views converged on five issues represented in the statements in our Q sample. This
consensus may serve as a prospective starting point for a politically sustainable auto-
mation of border control in the EU, given that participants from different Member
States and representing the extreme ends of the political spectrum share it. First, all
three views endorsed data minimisation, that is, limiting the collection of personal infor-
mation to “what is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish a specific purpose”
and retaining it “only for as long as it is necessary to fulfil that purpose” (European Data
Protection Supervisor 2015). Harvesting, using and storing personal data “presents both
a security risk and an erosion of civil liberties” (P1). Our participants stressed assuring tra-
vellers, citizens, that their data would only be used for purposes of border control (P3, P9,
P29, P31 and P44): people do not automatically consent to the state using their data for
other purposes (P38), while “further use of those data would violate civil rights” (P21).
Extensive data use was opposed as “collecting more data than is needed will only cloud
the picture” (P9); also, “there is little if any proof that more biometrics reduces false nega-
tive and positive identification” (P43). Therefore, our three views rejected the use of
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multiple biometrics (such as fingerprints, facial images and iris scans) in ABC, even though
the security industry is currently developing such solutions. Furthermore, a potential sur-
veillance creep in biometric data use worried the participants; Participant 41 articulated
these apprehensions:
Data leakage and recycling is a constant temptation for any data holder, especially a multi-
function body such as a state or the EU. Systems should be designed to minimise the oppor-
tunities for temptations to arise. There is no sign that any state has as yet sufficiently built into
its constitution, institutions or culture resistance to such “mission creep”. There is, however,
plenty of evidence that parts of them would actively welcome such a data hoard to mine,
and might quite readily connive with third party states to pass data on.
Broeders (2007, p. 87) shares this concern, in particular with an eye to the “unprecedented
scale” of data in the European border control databases, which may tempt authorities to
extend their use beyond the original purposes.
Second, participants subscribing to all views called for transparent data use: they
wanted to inform travellers clearly on how, by whom and why their data would be used.
This would guarantee the travellers the means to take action if their data were misused
(P31), which would help in achieving citizen support and legitimacy for the ABC systems
(P38 and P44). Third, on grounds of legal transparency, the participants supporting the
three views called for binding legal instruments and monitoring mechanisms to be set up
before creating new EU-wide information technology systems for border control. On
this point, Del Sarto and Steindler (2015, pp. 369–370) direct attention to how the EU’s
increasing competences in security management generate legal and procedural uncertain-
ties and “lack of transparency in terms of competences and accountability”.
Fourth, the views require democratic legitimacy from ABC systems, at least at the par-
liamentary level in each EU Member State, and preferably in civil society. Participants sub-
scribing to View 1 in particular drew attention to parliaments having to approve changes
affecting fundamental rights (P3 and P12). “The data should never be used for additional
purposes without a democratic political decision” (P43): parliamentary decisions would
thus render citizens less vulnerable to potential surveillance creeps associated with ABC.
Participants subscribing to View 2 also demanded political decisions and large-scale
debate within the civil society on ABC matters (P29), “to find a social agreement or at
least a wide understanding among the European population” (P4). Participants sharing
View 3 stress the power of decision of each nation state. They reached the same con-
clusion that ABC requires parliamentary approval.
The final issue agreed upon concerns the accessibility of ABC for disabled people, which
is considered a fundamental rights issue: “people with whichever disability have exactly
the same rights as the rest of the citizens” (P3). Creating accessible ABC systems was
deemed crucial (P2, P11, P25 and P29). “If such a sophisticated system can be created,
finding solutions for people with disabilities should be a part of the plan and the goals.
The solutions must be found at any cost”, commented Participant 2.
Conclusions
The technologisation of security is alongside digitalisation pivotal for the evolving border
control policies of the European Commission. Our results reiterate such a policy demand
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for ABC in the form of the (centre) right-wing View 2, welcoming ABC as an enhancement
in border security as well as a catalyst of European integration. This view conveys a “pol-
itical and institutional counter-move” to the setbacks witnessed in the Schengen borders
policy since 2015–2016 (see Alkopher and Blanc 2016, p. 23) and to the slow progress of
the Commission’s Smart Borders initiative since its inception in 2011. View 2 agrees with
the main thrust of the Commission’s border control policies. Supporters of this view would
most likely welcome the EES and ETIAS proposals of the Commission (see above). As such,
this view builds on the “deep-seated security dynamics” of the Schengen security commu-
nity and could ultimately help to sustain this community (Alkopher and Blanc 2016, p. 23).
However, our empirical results imply two major challenges for the technology-intensive
integration of border control envisaged by the Commission. The critical border studies lit-
erature can help to discern these challenges. First, this literature warns against taking tech-
nology as an “absolute security provider” (Ceyhan 2008, p. 102). One reason for caution is
that emerging technologies may cause uncertainty in society, which “results in a growing
gap between citizens, technology and politics”, especially with regard to the balance
between individual privacy and the “notion of common good” (Friedewald et al. 2010,
p. 63). Our results show that some political stakeholders worry about this potentially pre-
carious balance given an opportunity to express their subjective views. View 1 challenged
ABC as a security technology, emphasising the political aspects involved in technology
development (see, e.g. Amicelle et al. 2015, Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015). View
1 moreover reiterated the calls for exercising strict control over access to passengers’ bio-
metric data (see, e.g. Harel 2009) and any use of border control data contrary to the rights
of asylum seekers (e.g. Muller 2004) or anyone in the name of terrorism prevention (e.g.
Lodge 2004).
Second, we found the Eurosceptic and populist far right View 3 critical of harmonisation
of European ABC policies, preferring to develop border control on a national basis and
appealing to immigration-related threat perceptions. Here some strands in critical
border studies help to analyse the potential consequences of such views, warning how
any divergence on the part of the Schengen security community from the path of regional
integration and solidarity could send Europe back to the traditional power politics of
national interests, self-reliance and mistrust (Alkopher and Blanc 2016). Such a return is
possible since right-wing Eurosceptic populism has become mainstreamed (Brack and
Startin 2015), especially in our cases of the UK (Auel and Raunio 2014) and Finland
(Leruth 2015). In this situation, voices such as our third view portray the “people” being
justifiably concerned about increasing immigration and surveillance. Indeed, referring to
the will of the people is the core strategy of populism (Mény and Surel 2002). It is essential
to note our third view trusted neither governments, ABC technologies nor all travellers.
Simultaneously it lacked internal coherence. This is typical of populism, characterised by
opportunism, which is “more flexible than the value-laden dominant ideologies” (Mény
and Surel 2002, p. 18). Hence the third view called for transparency in data use, but encour-
aged the covert surveillance of passengers.
Although our results confirm the divisions among political stakeholders in the contem-
porary EU, they simultaneously highlight a potentially significant policy convergence on
privacy protection and inclusion. We suggest that the so far tedious European ABC and
the Smart Borders policy process could be revitalised and gain wider acceptance
among stakeholders and Member States if it were it to build on this convergence. The
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convergence emerged in the form of the consensus statements to which our participants
reacted consistently and strongly across the views.
First, the political stakeholders we approached agreed on the principle of data minimis-
ation when compiling biometric information from passengers, and on restricting the use
of data for other purposes. This urges caution regarding the Commission’s April 2016 pro-
posals on using multiple biometrics including both fingerprint and facial image recog-
nition, and for establishing a common biometric matching service open to various
authorities including law enforcement (see European Commission 2016b, pp. 8–9, 15).
Second, our participants required passengers to be informed transparently and efficiently
of the use made of their personal data. This suggests a need to design the passengers’ user
interface accordingly.
Third, our participants stressed how European-wide ABC requires a legal basis produced
through transparent political processes and democratic accountability, also involving dis-
cussions and decisions in national parliaments. This conveys a strong message to keep
security technology under democratic and public political control to ensure its acceptabil-
ity to the users. Currently Member States differ significantly on how they nationally debate
and respond to the Commission’s border control proposals. Euroscepticism may further
complicate such political processes across Europe. This support for democratic processes
is important: since the conclusion of our experiments in late 2014, many Member States
have experienced new waves of immigration and witnessed rampant populism among
some political parties questioning the human rights of new border-crossers and the exten-
sion of the democratic responsibilities of society towards them.
Fourth, the insistence of our stakeholders for accessibility for disabled passengers as a
fundamental right leads us to recommend following universal design principles. Overall,
this suggested consensus presupposes that political stakeholders are informed on the
development of harmonisation solutions to help them formulate their positions for forth-
coming political debates. We expect significant numbers of undecided political stake-
holders; informing them would most likely improve the prospects of EU-wide
harmonisation.
Regarding wider implications, although our results primarily concern ABC systems and
only to some extent the debate on Smart Borders, the degree of dissent we found reminds
us of the concerns that emerged in late 2015 regarding the future of the Schengen agree-
ment, when some Member States temporarily re-established border controls to curb
uncontrolled immigration. In other words, while Member States disagree on how much
EU-level policies can help to solve the “immigration crisis”, they also continue to disagree
on how much European integration can address the policy dilemmas concerning border
security. This may mean that the debates on EU-level border control policies will prove
long-lasting.
A further aspect of EU’s technologising border control is the ambiguity of the division of
labour between institutions and Member States. The EU’s “asymmetrical integration” has
gradually “shifted responsibility for border management to the European level”, thus creat-
ing a “mix of policy regimes that combine different institutional configurations” which
have both intergovernmental and supranational features (Del Sarto and Steindler 2015,
p. 371). Whereas the Commission proposes further technologisation of border control,
the European Parliament acts a guardian of the free movement of people and the Schen-
gen principles. The Member States possess the practical expertise in border control, while
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the Parliament has influenced the formulation of the Schengen Borders Code, for example,
regarding fundamental rights, transparency, non-discrimination and the training of border
guards (Huber 2015). Simultaneously, doubts persist on the extent to which the Schengen
acquis actually affects the practices of border policing at the peripheries of the EU (Hills
2006, p. 85).
Alongside the suggested consensus and wider implications, we must stress the limit-
ations of our research. They arise from the difficulty of reporting coherent further views
because our data contained idiosyncratic views not amenable to factor interpretation.
This partly fragmented nature of the data may imply that opinions on ABC are still evol-
ving, or the participants were torn between the interests of several groups. Moreover,
while trusting that the factors identified and interpreted reflect more general patterns,
with our methodology, we cannot establish how widely they are supported in individual
Member States or across the EU as a whole. That is the task of survey studies, other large-N
studies or comprehensive discourse analyses of national debates. There is also potential
for a fourth view, which could well include centre-right or conservative participants:
eight of the participants were not included in the definition of any of the views and all
but one of them represented such parties. To enquire into this in more detail, future
studies should consider how the debate on ABC and border control more widely
evolves in the Member States and on the EU level. While we expect the views identified
in this study also to emerge in further studies involving other Members States, such
studies should also further analyse the potential for border security consensus on the Euro-
pean level, which is only tentatively probed here.
Notes
1. Spain has experienced some left-wing Euroscepticism amidst its economic hardships, while
support for the Romanian Eurosceptic Greater Romania Party is marginal (Halikiopoulou
and Vasilopoulou 2014, Brack and Startin 2015).
2. We use the wider term “surveillance creep” to account for the expressions “mission creep” and
“function creep” when referring to systems, technologies or actors expanding the use of (bio-
metrical) data beyond the original purpose of their collection, potentially eroding privacy
rights (see Broeders 2007, Vukov and Sheller 2013).
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Appendix. Statement sample with Q sort values for each factor/view. The
position of each statement in the model appears in parentheses.
Statements associated with a factor in the analysis appear in bold face.
Consensus statements appear in both bold face and italics.
Statement F1 F2 F3
1. Honest people who have nothing to hide have no reason to refuse their biometric data (such as
fingerprints) being collected and used in border control (Aa)
−4 1 1
2. It would be best if the passengers did not know where, when and which controls are happening at
borders, so that potential attackers would be caught (Ab)
−2 −2 3
3. Clear statements must be provided to the travellers, on exactly how their biometric data are used,
with whom they are shared and for what purpose (Bb)
3 2 3
4. The EU should not go forward with ABC because it is too expensive, considering the big budget
cuts (Cc)
−1 −3 0
5. European border guards desperately need automated technology to be able to manage the
increasing passenger flows and to concentrate on checking risky travellers (Aa)
−2 1 −1
6. Member States that have to invest more than others in implementing the common standards on
automated, external border controls should be compensated by the EU (Cc)
0 −1 2
7. The EU should be a pioneer in getting the most modern, most efficient and safest technological
solutions in border management (Ac)
0 2 1
8. The ABC processes and gates have to be as similar as possible throughout Europe to make the
systems easy and fast to use, and thus cost-efficient (Aa)
1 2 −2
9. The problems of corruption and discrimination by border guards can be avoided by automatising
border controls (Ab)
−1 1 0
10. People bound to wheelchairs must accept that they will not be able to use ABC gates (Ab) −4 −4 −2
11. European companies should be heavily prioritised when ordering gates and software for ABC in
the EU (Ac)
−1 0 0
12. Decisions regarding technical issues, such as biometrics in border control, should be left in the
hands of experts and scientists (Ab)
−3 −1 −1
13. In ABC, the decisions to allow entrance are made by profiling groups of people as risky, which may
lead to discrimination on grounds of nationality, ethnic origin, skin colour, etc. (Ba)
3 0 −2
14. Developing applications also suitable for land and maritime crossings should be a priority in the
process of automatising border controls (Ac)
−1 1 2
15. Claiming that citizens have to give up privacy rights for the governments to be able to keep them
safe is entirely false and creates an atmosphere where people no longer know their rights (Ba)
1 0 0
16. In many EU Member States, the data protection systems are currently not reliable enough to be
used in ABC (Ca)
1 0 2
17. ABC and Smart Borders may lead to increased, unjustified surveillance of EU citizens, whose
movements can easily be recorded and stored in the future (Bb)
3 −3 1
(Continued )
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Appendix. Continued.
Statement F1 F2 F3
18. It is enough to verify that the passenger’s biometrics match the data in the passport at the border.
No EU-wide identification databases are needed (Bb)
1 −3 −1
19. The goal of ABC is simply to make travelling fast and easy (Cb) −2 1 −1
20. The least possible amount of biometric data can be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and must not be further used for other purposes (Bc)
4 4 2
21. Before creating new EU-wide IT systems for border control, binding legal instruments and
monitoring mechanisms to control the IT systems must be agreed on (Bc)
2 3 3
22. When designing ABC systems and databases for the EU, their effects to the just treatment of
people seeking international protection at the borders must be considered thoroughly (Bc)
2 2 0
23. Before proceeding with ABC, the plans must have democratic legitimacy in each Member State at
least on the Parliament level and preferably among civil society (Bc)
4 3 4
24. The use of highly effective technologies at parts of the border may trigger the increased use of
other, more dangerous illegal entry points (e.g. maritime routes) (Ba)
0 0 1
25. Collecting biometric information and recording the entry and exit of all third-country nationals
crossing the EU’s external borders will increase the time most travellers spend at border controls,
no matter how much new technologies are able to speed up the process (Ca)
0 −1 −1
26. ABC and Smart Borders are presented mainly as technological developments, which hides their
vast political and legal implications (Ca)
2 −1 4
27. The increasing use of biometrics in border control is in the interests of political hardliners who
view immigration as a threat to the EU’s homeland security (Ca)
1 −2 −3
28. Opposing ABC originates from the radical idea to oppose all kinds of governmental surveillance,
including border control (Cb)
−2 −1 −3
29. It is a contradictory EU policy to get rid of visas and at the same time tighten the border controls
with technology (Cb)
0 −2 −3
30. ABC technology will be expensive at first, but in the long run it is a better investment than hiring
more border guards (Aa)
−1 4 −2
31. Governments of developing countries cannot produce biometric passports, which will bring
unjustified suspicion onto their citizens in ABC (Cb)
0 0 −4
32. Gathering fingerprints from third-country nationals at border-crossings makes travellers suspects,
which threatens the democratic presumption of innocence (Bb)
2 −2 −4
33. EU laws should be avoided in border control because they represent EU federalisation (Cc) −3 −4 0
34. Law enforcement authorities in EU Member States must be able to access all existing and new
biometric EU databases used in border control, in order to solve serious crimes and combat
terrorism (Cc)
−3 3 1
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